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o ."uR intuitive satisfaction with philosophical models 
of rational belief in science is, of course, highly influenced by our experience 
of the historical development of science as practiced. While one can go overboard 
in this direction, emphasizing conformity to a history infected with “accident” 
and neglecting critical examination of the usual standards of rationality on their 
own merits, surely it is reasonable to let one’s views of how science ought to 
be influenced by how best scientific practice has historically proceeded.
Clearly the long existence of geometry as the single clearly systematized and 
secure science was largely responsible for the persuasiveness of models of science 
which posited that (at least ideally) all beliefs ought to be founded upon indub­
itable self-evidence. The lengthy sway of Newtonian mechanics as a (possibly) 
all encompassing and final theory founded upon inference from the data of the 
senses surely was instrumental in the long domination of philosophy of science 
by inductivist models. And the scientific revolutions of the twentieth century, 
especially those aspects of the revolution which showed us that the wealth of 
data previously taken to support Newtonian theory was, when taken in con­
junction with the new data incompatible with the older theory, equally supportive 
of novel theories incompatible with the Newtonian, was straight-forwardly in­
fluential on a range of philosophies of science ranging from Popper’s skepticism 
of the notion of inductive support through those who take the quasi-Kantian line 
that our very understanding of what the data is is an imposition on the world by 
us of our theoretical preconceptions.
The question 1 want to examine here is this: Quantum mechanics and relativity 
show us that the data which seemed to support very well one theory can be seen, 
in the light of scientific change, to support as well quite different theories, 
theories incompatible with the older theory in deep theoretical and conceptual 
ways. Now consider the attempt to decide, at any moment, whether or not a 
given set of data supports a hypothesis. Having in mind the potential existence 
of a vast array of theories, genuine alternatives to the hypotheses we have brought 
to mind, but alternatives which we haven’t yet even imagined, should we not 
wonder if amongst that vast array of alternatives there might not be some which, 
were we to know what they were like, we would consider even better supported
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by the present data than any of the alternatives we have brought to awareness?
This is, of course, a kind of skepticism about induction, but it is worthwhile 
to distinguish it from skepticism founded upon distinct, although closely related, 
grounds. We can look upon Humean skepticism, perhaps, as skepticism founded 
upon the fact that all the possible data is never in. I ought not to believe all crows 
are black on the basis of the observed sample of crows, for nothing in the nature 
of the sample assures me that the very next crow won’t break the pattern.
We could be led to a skepticism closer to the one I have in mind by Goodmanian 
arguments, although Goodman, of course, doesn’t draw skeptical conclusions 
from his observations. “Grueish” hypotheses are, like the ones I have in mind, 
alternatives to our ordinary hypotheses all equally compatible with the empirical 
evidence to date. But, presumably, what we are to do as philosophers is to figure 
out what is wrong with these outlandish hypotheses. Whether the line one takes 
is Goodman’s notion of the entrenchment, or some version of the thesis that our 
selection of projectible predicates is itself rationalized by our current best avail­
able background theory, we are, in any case, led away from skepticism by some 
argument designed to show us that as things stand now we do have some reason 
for preferring as genuine scientific alternatives members of the set of hypotheses 
from which we do choose, to alternatives constructed in the Goodmanian manner 
which can somehow be rejected as spurious candidates.
While the issues here are close to those with which I am concerned, they are 
not identical. What I have in mind is, rather, the skepticism engendered by 
reflection upon historical scientific experience; skepticism based not upon the 
existence of outlandish pseudo-hypotheses cooked up by the philosophical ma­
nipulation of predicates, but, rather, on the reasonable assumption, warranted 
by past experience, that there are vast numbers of perfectly respectable scientific 
hypotheses, hypotheses which, were we aware of them, would receive our most 
serious scientific consideration, but which, due to the limitations of our scientific 
imagination, we just haven’t yet brought to mind. What we are concerned with 
is a Newton dubious of the inverse square law, not because objects might obey 
it up to 1700 and cease to do so thereafter, but because he imagines the possibility 
of an array of genuine alternatives to his theory even though, of course, he can’t 
imagine just what such alternative theories would be like.
Nor am I concerned with the problem of theoretical under-determination in 
any of its forms. The alternatives I have in mind are not those variants of the 
original theory which a positivist would declare trivial semantic alternatives. I 
shall not be concerned with alternatives constructed by manipulation of the 
theoretical apparatus which leaves observational consequences invariant, nor with 
those quaint alleged alternatives which one gets by switching from talk of objects 
to talk of time slices, from things to modes of spacetime points, and the like. 
General relativity is not, in any way, an “empirically equivalent’’ variant of the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation. But shouldn’t a prudent Newton have realized 
that such a theory could exist, even if he couldn’t say what it was? And might 
not some such unimagined theory be more plausible, even relative to present 
data, than Newton’s own? And shouldn’t we now admit the existence. Platonic- 
ally, of innumerable alternatives to our best present theories, alternatives all 
of which would save the current data equally well, but none of which arc equiv­
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alent, vis-à-vis all possible empirical experience, to the currently accepted hy­
potheses? Shouldn’t we realize that these alternatives exist, even if we can’t say 
what they are? And shouldn’t we accept the fact that among these unimagined 
alternatives some may very well be more plausible than our own theories relative 
to present observational facts?
The depth of the problem we face here can be emphasized by just a brief 
consideration of a number of models of theory choice we have been offered by 
methodologists. In each case we see that we can make sense of the adoption of 
one hypothesis only by viewing the decision process as the selection of the 
preferred hypothesis from an antecedently given set of possible alternatives. In 
each case we must wonder if we are left with any coherent theory at all when 
we face up to the fact that the set of hypotheses we have yet brought to mind 
constitutes only an infinitesimal finite fragment of the full range of alternatives.
Consider, for example, the attempt to resolve the familiar problems encoun­
tered in trying to define a notion of qualitative confirmation which proceeds by 
arguing that an instance is confirming of one hypothesis only relative to an 
alternative choice or set of such alternative choices. If the set of alternatives we 
should really have in mind is the indeterminate class of all possible hypotheses, 
including ones we have not yet thought up, can we understand what it is for an 
observational instance to confirm a given hypothesis at all?
Consider Bayesian strategies for confirmation theory. Here we must distribute 
a priori probabilities over all the alternative hypotheses to be considered. If there 
is only a finite set of hypotheses we have in mind, this is easy to do, even if it 
isn’t easy to find any source beyond subjective whim for rationalizing any par­
ticular chosen distribution. Even when the set of alternatives is infinite, if it can 
be characterized by some orderly parameterization we have the means (say by 
moving from point to interval estimation) of plausibly assigning a priori prob­
abilities and then grinding through conditionalization with respect to the evidence 
in the usual way. But if we must keep in mind the infinite and indeterminate 
class of all possible hypotheses, known and unknown, how can we even begin 
to assign a priori probabilities to those few hypotheses (or parameterized sets 
of them) we do have in mind (unless, perhaps, to give them all a priori probability 
zero on the basis of their very small place in the space of all possible hypotheses)?
Consider inference to the best explanation. Should we adopt that hypothesis 
relative to which the evidence has the highest likelihood of all the likelihoods 
generated by the hypotheses we have in mind as alternatives? Rather, shouldn’t 
we realize that in the vast sea of alternatives we have not yet considered it is all 
too probable that there is some, as yet inconceived, hypothesis relative to which 
the evidential warrant is even better explained than it is by our current best 
candidate? On this basis shouldn’t we agree that being the best of an arbitrarily 
selected and narrow class simply isn’t being good enough to be believed, and 
once again skeptically withold our judgment?
Finally we ought to consider those attempts at reconstructing scientific infer­
ence which rely less upon fomial mcxlels of hyp<ithesis choice and more upon 
models of choice allegedly founded up<m abstraction from historical scientific 
practice. Familiarity with this literature once again shows us a universal pre- 
deliction for the competitive model: belief is to be credited to that hypothesis
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which does best in competition for survival with its rivals, be they older, pre­
viously accepted, hypotheses or novel alternatives recently contrived. But what 
credibility can accrue to the victor in a battle for survival which, by historical 
accident and paucity of imagination, simply keeps nearly all of the competitors 
out of the arena?
An initial response to the alleged skeptical consequences of the existence of 
inconceived hypotheses would be to affirm that since we cannot possibly deal 
with the unavailable, its existence or potential existence cannot be relevant to 
questions of justification. For example it might be argued that to be skeptical of 
induction because all of the data on which we might make a judgment are not 
yet in is to misconstrue what justification in the inductive context means. The 
whole point of induction is to allow us to draw inferences on less than an 
exhaustive observation of all the facts in the world, and so, to declare an inference 
unjustified simply because it proceeds on the basis of a small sample of obser­
vational facts is to misconstrue what would count as a justified inference in the 
inductive context.
Similarly, the argument might go, by its very nature the process of hypothesis 
selection in science requires us to make our decision on the basis of the consid­
eration of only that limited selection of hypotheses which have come to mind 
at a given time. It is as impossible to consider as potential candidates for belief 
all possible hypotheses as it is to have in view all possible observational facts 
about the world. Accusations of “ mere contingency” or of its being “accidental” 
that we have considered those hypotheses we have brought to mind and not the 
others are not more supportive of skepticism here than would be the claim that 
it is accidental that we have the observational data we do have and not some 
other sample in the inductive case. To be justified in accepting a hypothesis, it 
will be argued, is to have selected the best among the available candidates. The 
invocation of other possible hypotheses not yet brought to mind as a grounds for 
skepticism is just a misconstrual of what counts as justification in the context 
in question. It is no argument that one isn’t justified in doing what one does on 
the basis one has by pointing out that the basis for inference is weaker than 
another which is, in fact, impossible to obtain.
Up to a point I think that this argument has merit. Whenever a procedure in 
which we have pre-analytic confidence is criticized by invidious comparison with 
some ideal which is, by its very nature, unobtainable, we are justified in invoking 
as our first defense of the procedure in question the argument that the only 
justification for giving up a procedure, imperfect as it may be, is the move to 
a better one. It is never justified, it will be claimed, to give up the best procedure 
one has simply on the basis that it doesn’t meet standards which are in principle 
unfulfillable in any case.
But, of course, the skeptic can reply that just as the best hypothesis may not 
be good enough, leading us to withhold judgment (and this not simply as a 
skeptical general withholding of judgment, but as the right thing to do, at least 
temporarily, in actual cases—even under very unskeptical decision-making 
schemes), so the best methodology may simply not be good enough. If this
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leaves us without any rational grounds for decision making, says the skeptic, 
well, that is just too bad. Of course we may continue to decide with the vulgar 
while chastely withholding Judgment in the privacy of our learned study.
Rather than debate this general issue, though, I think it more profitable to note 
that there are some general moves one can make in this case, moves which if 
not fully resolving the issues between the skeptic and his opponent, at least throw 
some light on the issues between them. Let me turn to these.
First let us consider a couple of related arguments which attempt to mitigate 
our skepticism by urging on us a subtler understanding of the content of our 
hypotheses than might have initially occurred to us.
(a) One such move is to urge on us a distinction between our fundamental 
theory of the world (or “cosmology” ) and those more limited theories charac­
terizing narrower features of reality. Into the former class go such things as our 
general spacetime theory, our general theory of objects and their states (at the 
moment relativistic quantum field theory—such as it is), etc. Into the latter class 
would go theories of the chemical realization of the genetic code, of covalent 
chemical bonding, of superconductivity, of plate tectonics, etc.
Do we really harbor the suspicion that, in the fullness of time, we will either 
come to believe, aware as we will be of novel hypotheses we hadn’t previously 
considered, that our earlier acceptance of theories was then unwarranted? Of our 
general, fundamental, cosmological theories I think this might be so. And if we 
do harbor the suspicion of this possibility, how can we be assured of the per­
manence of the warrant for the narrower, less fundamental theories all of which 
presuppose the correctness of our cosmological views?
I suggest it is Just this presuppositional nature of the narrower theories, properly 
understood, which can immunize them from the kind of skeptical doubt which 
infects our belief in our grand cosmology. For, I suggest, we may understand 
the content of the narrower theory as being relativized to the background cos­
mology. So that our understanding of, say, the claim that genes are DNA mol­
ecules can be thought of as invariant (and hence its warrant invariant) under even 
a radical revision of our understanding of Just what molecules (or material things 
in general) are.
Suppose Wheelerian fantasies are one day realized, and we find that DNA 
molecules, like all other matter, are Just tightly knotted up bits of spacetime. 
Even wilder, suppose that our future scientists finally see the wisdom of the 
Leibnitzian view that all the world is a construct of spiritual monads. Would any 
of this change our opinion that genes are DNA molecules? Or that we were so 
warranted in believing in 1975? Would it change our estimate of our earlier 
warrant that electron sharing holds some molecules together? Or that supercon­
ductivity is the result of long-range pairing which bonds fermion electrons into 
the suitable constituents of a degenerate boson gas? I think not.
Of course how we then “understand” those narrower theories might change. 
The meaning of plate tectonic theory is, I suppose, rather different when we 
come to suppose that crustal plates are, like everything else, thoughts in the mind
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of the great world-spirit (or whatever), than is the meaning of that theory under 
our present cosmological scheme. But be that as it may I still think there is 
plausibility to the claim that while contemplation of inconceived hypotheses 
might make us skeptical of our warrant for our grandest, most fundamental 
theories, it really doesn’t influence our confidence in the warrant we hold for 
inductively well-grounded narrower theories. Do we really think that any future 
increment in scientific imaginativeness could lead us to doubt that yeasts cause 
fermentation, or that vision is mediated by the impact of light on the retina of 
the eye? If the future does do in these theories it will do so only by a dissolution 
of the cosmological background they presuppose. And if we understand the 
meaning of these narrower theories as being relativized to the background cos­
mology (“Genes are DNA molecules, whatever molecules are” ), we block skept­
ical concern about the narrower theories based on the dubiousness of their cos­
mological backgrounds.
Nothing here is meant to prove that we ought not to be as skeptical of the 
warrant for the narrower theories as of the grander. Rather, it is meant to point 
out that insofar as there is real doubt, based on the contemplation of hypotheses 
yet unborn, it is doubt localized in general in the domain of fundamental theories. 
Such real doubt infects our confidence in the warrant of narrower theories only 
to the extent that they are not yet firmly established in the ordinary, inductive, 
sense. No doubt we are more confident in the theory of polymers than we are, 
say, in the theory of superconductivity or of plate tectonics. To that extent we 
remain more open to the possibility that there is some real alternative better 
explanation of the phenomena treated by the latter than we do to the possibility 
that some alternative to long-chain molecules will someday explain plastics better 
than current molecular chemistry does. But, in general, while both narrow and 
cosmological theories can be replete with empirical support, for the latter, but 
not for the former, we are genuinely assailed by doubts which originate in our 
awareness that there are more theories in Plato’s heaven than have, as yet, been 
dreamt up by our theoreticians.
(b) There is another way of attempting to vitiate skepticism by re-understanding 
the content of theories which is generally applicable to both narrower and cos­
mological theories. The degree to which it can assuage our skeptical doubts is, 
however, quite problematic. Here I refer to the proposal that we take hypotheses 
not as asserting their manifest content but only as putting forth that content as 
approximately true or partially true.
Perhaps this approach can be motivated by referring, once again, to the down­
fall of the Newtonian system. As everyone knows, wrong as Newtonian dynamics 
and Newtonian gravitational theory may be, the theory remains a superb ap­
proximation to the truth in a vast variety of instances. Should we not, then, in 
anticipation of future scientific revolutions overthrowing our present cosmological 
theory, take our present fundamental theory to be, like Newton’s, at best a body 
of partial and approximate truth? And if we do this can we not protect ourselves 
against the attack of the skeptic? For while his allusion to unborn hypotheses 
may very well make us dubious of our claim to hold the final truth, even the 
prospect of unimagined alternatives to the ones we have considered cannot lead
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us to doubt that our present best cosmological theories are warranted as at least 
a good approximation to the truth or at least in part true.
One objection to this “way out” might be that although we can, indeed, have 
some assurance that our present best theories will always retain some value as 
approximate truths, we cannot now know, in the light of future hypotheses we 
might come up with much less in the light of possible new data, just where the 
present theory is going to fail to tbe reliable (or warranted as reliable) and where 
it will retain its approximative value. Thus, it might be argued, even weakening 
our attribution of content to one of mere approximate truth does not really help 
us in the face of skepticism of the kind we have been considering, since we can’t 
now know, in the absence of knowledge of just what hypotheses are as yet 
unborn, just which parts of our current theory we are presently warranted as 
taking as even approximately true.
But, realistically, things aren’t as bad as all that. Can’t we be assured now, 
that whatever new hypotheses come along in the future, we will never give up 
our present estimation of the reliability of relativistic quantum field theory to 
predict the energy levels in the hydrogen atom? Couldn’t Newton, ignorant of 
quantum mechanics and of relativity but knowledgeable of the fact that some 
theories he hadn’t yet thought of would fit the data as well as the best theory he 
had come across, still be assured that whatever the future brought the inverse 
square law of gravity and Newtonian dynamics would remain inviolate as a good 
approximate account of planetary motion?
There is a far deeper objection, however, to the way out of skepticism which 
tells us to take the content attributed to presently believed hypotheses as only 
approximate and partial. Once again the real pressure of skepticism only arises 
when we consider our most fundamental, cosmological theories. It can be argued 
(and has frequently been) that the transition from Newton to relativity (not to 
speak of the transition to quantum mechanics) constituted a total shift to a new 
world picture completely incommensurable (as the cliché goes) with the picture 
of the world on the older theory. From this, very familiar, point of view there 
is no sense in which the older theory can be viewed as even approximately 
correct, misconstruing as it does (from the relativistic point of view) the most 
fundamental facts about spacetime, and, worse yet, (from the quantum mechan­
ical point of view) being mired in the fallacious classical conception of an 
objective world independent of measuring apparatus, etc. Even as an approxi­
mation if we could make sense of such a notion, Newton’s theory is a failure.
Seeing this, how could we not imagine the vast realm of hypotheses we have 
not yet thought up which differ as much in their ultimate picture of the world 
as our present physical picture differs from the Newtonian? And yet each of 
these hypotheses is to be imagined as fitting the data by which we support our 
present account as well as does our own best theory and better supported by it. 
Imagining such a realm of not yet conceived hypotheses, how can we be anything 
but skeptical of the warrant by which we hold to belief in our present theories— 
even viewing them merely as approximations to the truth?
Perhaps there is an anti-skeptical reply to this. It would require first making 
sense of the notion of conceptual approximation, showing us, against the familiar
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arguments of the incommensurabilists, that one can make sense of one theory 
approximating the conceptual apparatus of another. Next the full reply to skep­
ticism would have to indicate some way in which we could obtain some assurance 
that we need not now fear the existence, in the realm of as yet inconceived 
hypotheses, of numbers of sufficiently plausible hypotheses so radically different 
conceptually from our present best theory that we could not speak of our present 
best choice as even conceptually approximating these new alternatives. For were 
such unborn hypotheses to be now believed in by us, would we not be skeptical 
of the warrant for our current best theory? I have no idea how either a notion 
of conceptual approximation could be obtained, nor any idea how we could 
assure ourselves of the non-existence of plausible but radical still inconceived 
novelties.
There is an alternative method of attempting to evade skepticism which allows 
us to credit to our hypotheses the full content they seem manifestly to maintain. 
This option suggests, rather, that we modify our epistemic attitude toward the 
“winning” hypotheses in some direction away from the intuitive and naive no­
tion of belief. That is, instead of saying that we believe the most success­
ful of contending hypotheses (withholding belief, presumably, because of our 
awareness of the rich body of not-yet-conceived alternatives), we say, rather, 
that we hold some weaker, subtler epistemic attitude toward the victorious 
contender.
One such approach, of course, is to move from the dichotomy of belief and 
disbelief toward some version of epistemic probability—subjective, logical, or 
otherwise. But I don’t think that this will be a satisfactory move at this point. 
For as we have seen earlier it would be too easy for the skeptic to push us to the 
point of admitting only zero probability for the hypotheses we have thought up. 
There is an anti-skeptical reply to this to which we will return later, however.
The approach I have in mind here, though, is to adopt a locution similar to 
those familiar to us from Popper. Since the totality of data is never in, and since 
Popper is skeptical of inductivist claims to warrant from samples, he argues that 
we ought not to believe even our best conjectures. Rather, we ought to speak of 
“tentatively holding” them or “momentarily adopting” them. Should we not, 
similarly, in the face off unborn hypotheses, forever withhold belief from our 
best current contender, instead adopting a fallibilistic attitude framed in some 
such jargon?
While there may be some value to this approach, in the end 1 think it the least 
useful way of confronting the skeptical challenge. The trouble is, of course, that 
just as “all the data” is never in, so we never exhaust in our consideration the 
totality of the Platonic universe of possible hypotheses. On the view under 
consideration, then, we ought to forever withhold belief, however partial. But 
if our stance is, forever, merely to adopt or maintain (or whatever) a current 
hypothesis, but at the same time to use it to explain the phenomena, predict the 
outcome of future experiments and control the world, then what useful distinction 
have we made between this allegedly weakened epistemic attitude and genuine
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belief? Surely, moving in this direction smacks all too much of wanting to have 
one’s skeptical cake while getting the nutritional advantages of consuming the 
meal, dessert and all.
The most interesting reply to the kind of skepticism we have been considering 
is that which attempts to meet it head on. Rather than evading skepticism by 
weakening the putative content of hypotheses which are accepted from their face 
value, or by reducing acceptance to something less than belief or partial belief, 
this approach argues that we might very well have good reasons for standing by 
our choice of the best of the contenders for belief, even acknowledging the vast 
array of as yet unexpressed alternatives we have ignored in the decision-making 
process. These reasons might be “quasi a priori’’ or they might, themselves, be 
a sort of induction from our empirical experience. Let us look at a few arguments 
of this sort.
(a) What could assure us of the reasonableness of our belief in the hypothesis 
selected as best from the set of available contenders even though we know there 
is an infinite plentitude of alternative hypotheses we simply haven’t considered? 
Well, suppose we had some reason to believe that the hypotheses we have 
considered are all, in at least one crucial respect, and relative to present data of 
course, superior in warrant to all those not yet thought up. But how could we 
know or have reason to believe this when we don’t even know what the unborn 
alternatives are?
Consider the simplicity of hypotheses. Whatever that is, and however we are 
to assign degrees of it to hypotheses, it is frequently said that, all other things 
being equal, we ought to believe the simplest of alternative hypotheses. Why we 
should prefer the simple hypothesis to the more complex is very hard to say. 
Without some plausible a priorism it is hard to connect simplicity with any 
plausible “mark of truth,’’ and “pragmatic’’ rationales are notoriously difficult, 
to sustain in the epistemic context. Be that as it may, let us assume that it is right 
to believe the simpler rather than the more complex alternative (all other things, 
of course, being equal).
But if simpler hypotheses are preferable to less simple, do we not have at least 
some reason for dismissing the claims of skepticism founded upon the existence 
of as yet inconceived hypotheses? For do we have not, now, some fair warrant 
for believing that the hypotheses not yet thought up will be less simple than those 
which have come to mind?
By what right might we believe this? One reason could be the “empirical 
generalization’’ that, as a matter of psychological fact, scientists generally do 
think up simple hypotheses before the more complex alternatives occur to them. 
More interesting, if more speculative, is a “quasi a priori’’ argument: Perhaps 
the very meaning of simplicity is given by the order of imagination. Perhaps we 
simply call simpler those hypotheses we are (generally) likely to think up first. 
From this point of view simplicity, and hence plausibility, are granted to those 
hypotheses we have considered over those we have not by the very fact that the 
former have come to mind!
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Here resort to historical cases may be informative, but the matter would have 
to be explored with some care. To be sure the data which Newton relied on in 
support of his theories of dynamics and gravitation can be seen to be compatible 
also with quantum mechanics and with special and general relativity. But, surely, 
even were Newton to be aware of those theories he would have been justified in 
sticking to his original hypotheses as the simplest, hence most worthy of belief, 
of the alternatives then in mind relative to the data available to him.
On the other hand there are some well known alternatives to the Newtonian 
theory, unavailable to Newton, which are such that we might very well be inclined 
to say that had Newton been aware of them he would have been obligated, by 
his very own standards of rational belief in science, to have opted for these 
alternatives and dropped his original theory, even relative to the data which he 
was in possession of at the time. I have here in mind so-called neo-Newtonian 
spacetimes both in their flat and curved version. The former provides an alter­
native to the Newtonian account which allows one to retain the empirical con­
sequences of Newtonian dynamics without postulating a spacetime structure rich 
enough to allow the definability of absolute velocity, a notoriously “unobserv­
able” quantity in Newton’s original theory. The latter assimilates gravity to 
spacetime curvature, as in general relativity, but in such a way as to reproduce 
the empirical consequences of Newtonian gravitational theory. Again it has con­
ceptual advantages over the original Newtonian theory, eliminating the distinc­
tion, present in the original theory, but empirically undeterminable, between the 
absence of a gravitational field and the presence of one whose uniformity makes 
it undetectable by fooling us into thinking that free-fall is inertial motion.
It is at least plausible to argue that had Newton been aware of these alternatives, 
considerations of simplicity (in some sense of that elusive concept) would have 
obligated him to prefer them as explanatory of the very data he used to back up 
his belief in his own theory. But here the alternatives to the original theory are 
those a positivist would declare mere trivial semantic variants of the older theory, 
for they are alternatives specifically designed to duplicate the totality of obser­
vational consequences of the original Newtonian theory.
It would be well worth a historical investigation to ask if there are any cases 
where the following pattern of development actually occurred: An original theory 
was well accepted by the scientific community to account for a range of empirical 
data. Later a new hypothesis was thought up which, while having some predictive 
consequences which have distinguished it as a genuine alternative theory from 
the original, was equally compatible with the original vis-à-vis the range of data 
which was taken to support the earlier theory. Further, the alternative was such 
that, even neglecting the possibility of testing it against the original theory by 
empirically exploring those regions where they give differing empirical predic­
tions, a rational person would argue that had this theory been thought up at the 
time, it would have been more worthy of belief than the older theory at the time 
the original theory was adopted and in the light of the data which at that time 
supported the theory actually adopted.
I have not been able to think of a clear-cut example of this kind. Perhaps there 
are some. But they are surely few such cases. Isn’t that alone somewhat persuasive 
in favor of the argument we have been considering: Either as a matter of empirical 
fact or of a priori truth, we just do think of the more believable hypotheses first.
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Yet the example of neo-Newtonian spacetime, although, as explained, not quite 
the kind of example needed to counter the claim, will make one hesitate to accept 
this refutation of skepticism too glibly.
A variant of this account might go as follows, bringing us once again to the 
problem of a priori probabilities considered earlier: In any Bayesian theory of 
inference we need to assign to hypotheses intrinsic a priori probabilities. Could 
we not have some grounds, again either empirical or a priori, for assuming that 
hypotheses we have thought up have higher a priori probabilities than any in the 
vast array not yet brought to mind? Once again this belief could be founded on 
a psychological (historical?) generalization that people generally do think up 
intrinsically plausible hypotheses first. Or it could be founded on an attempt to 
show that our very assignment of a priori probabilities, on many accounts a 
“subjective” matter anyway, is just a numerical representation of the order in 
which hypotheses occur to us. Even the infinitude of hypotheses not yet brought 
to mind need not be devastating to this argument, since we could supplement 
it with some view about the way in which a priori probability clumps up among 
a few initial alternatives leaving little to be distributed among the vast totality 
remaining. Once again, a defense in depth of this position would not be easy 
to provide, but is there not some plausibility to the claim that although there are, 
indeed, many, many hypotheses we haven’t yet considered, surely there is some­
times good reason to think that the ones we have brought to mind grab the lion’s 
share of intrinsic believability amongst them?
(b) A related but interestingly different argument against the skeptic would 
have us rely not upon the general likelihood of simpler or more a priori plausible 
hypotheses coming to mind first, but, instead, upon a higher order inductive 
rationale to the view that, as things actually stand now in the present state of 
science, we need not be reduced by the spectre of unborn hypotheses to skeptical 
dismay.
The argument I have in mind goes something like this: At an early or “ im­
mature” state of science we should, to be sure, be extremely tentative in adopting 
any hypothesis merely because it is best among the competitors brought to 
consciousness. But as science enters its mature stage we need not be so diffident. 
On the basis of a kind of meta-level inductive reasoning we may have good 
reason to believe that the hypothesis on which we have fixed our belief is not 
only the best possible choice from among the alternatives we have considered, 
but is also superior to any hypothesis in the remaining body of those as yet 
unimagined. Indeed, we may have reason to think that of all those as yet not 
brought to mind, none is sufficiently viable that were it to occur to us it would 
result in any serious weakening of our confidence in the choice we have made.
Actually, the usual version is a little more modest than that. More often it 
would be claimed that while awareness of a novel hypothesis would make us 
lose some confidence in our currently accepted beliefs as good approximations 
(conceptual and otherwise) to the truth. That is, while few would argue that such 
higher order inductions to maturity of science would lead us to conclude that our 
science is finished, many would argue, I believe, that such inductions do justify 
us in considering our present beliefs well along the road to final maturity.
On what basis could such an inductive assurance of the unimportance of the 
inconceived be founded? Well, just as skepticism, real skepticism, about indue-
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tion which refers to the vast array of evidential facts not yet considered could 
be at least partially muted by a consideration of the vast range and diversity of 
facts taken into account by our present theory, and the paucity of known phe­
nomena as yet unexplained, skepticism of the kind we have been considering 
might be met by reference ot the enormous richness and diversity of hypothesis 
types that have been considered, the extent and intensity of imagination employed 
in thinking up all imaginable relevant alternatives, etc. Surely there is something 
in the reply of the scientist to the philosopher which is often heard: “ You try to 
induce skepticism in me by referring to the vast array of hypotheses, concordant 
with the data, which we haven’t yet considered. But we have thought long and 
hard looking for such novel alternatives and have come up with none—other than 
the silly philosophical variants of current theory which, in the present context, 
just don’t count.’’
Of course the skeptic has the obvious reply. One’s certainty of the maturity 
of present day science, in the sense we have been discussing, is really no more 
than one’s certainty in the correctness (or approximate correctness) of current 
science. But this certainty of the irrelevance of unimagined alternatives is itself 
founded upon an ignorance of just what those alternatives might be. Just as we 
can induce skepticism with regard to current, inductively grounded, belief in 
science by referring to hypotheses not yet imagined, so such reference should 
be equally persuasive in inducing skepticism in the inductively grounded belief 
that, as a matter of fact, no such unimagined hypothesis would reduce confidence 
in our current beliefs were they to come to light.
In the light of the considerations above, it is worth while asking what our 
epistemic attitude ought to be, at the present time, to our best available “cos­
mological” theory. Can we be assured that it is not the case that our paucity of 
imagination has caused us to overlook alternatives to our present fundamental 
physical theory which, were we to be aware of them, we would think far more 
plausible candidates as correct explainers of present data?
It certainly is the case that confidence in the immutability of our present theory, 
at least as good conceptual approximation to the ultimate accepted hypothesis, 
is not universal. While many of the conceptual difficulties of relativistic quantum 
field theory, the closest thing we have to an overall fundamental theory at the 
present time, appear to be the kind of difficulties which further refinement will 
eliminate (I refer here to problems of divergence, renormalization, etc.), the 
conceptual peculiarities of the underlying general quantum formalism leave many 
very skeptical indeed that it, or anything quite like it, will be the ultimate way 
in which we will view the world. The difficulties involved in characterizing a 
measurement, in understanding the curious non-causal non-locality of correla­
tions, etc., are well known.
But at least three distinct scenarios can be offered by someone who predicts 
the ultimate demise of our present conceptual scheme in physics:
(1) Someone sufficiently clever will eventually see how to construct an alter­
native scheme which, having exactly the same experimental consequences as 
present day quantum theory, lacks the conceptual elements in it which lead to 
difficulties in understanding. This would parallel the discovery of neo-Newtonian
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spacetimes as conceptually superior reconstructions of the original Newtonian 
theories of dynamics and gravitation.
(2) Someone sufficiently clever will eventually discover an alternative to quan­
tum mechanics. This new theory will differ from quantum mechanics in some 
of its observational predictions. But the data which presently supports quantum 
mechanics will support this theory equally well. On the other hand, since the 
novel alternative is so much conceptually superior to quantum mechanics, even 
prior to a test of the observational areas where the new theory differs from the 
present one, many will affirm that the new theory is a more plausible account of 
the old data than is quantum mechanics, and that had we been clever enough to 
think it up in the first place we would have seen from the very beginning how 
implausible quantum mechanics was relative to this, as it happened, not then 
thoughtup competitor.
(3) Prior to the discovery of new data not compatible with quantum mechanics, 
no one will think up anything better. New observational results will, however, 
eventually lead to a new fundamental theory. Of course this new theory, incom­
patible with quantum mechanics as it may be, will account for all the obser­
vational results which made quantum theory seem so plausible before the new 
observational results were in. Even accepting this new theory, though, we will 
say that those who accepted quantum mechanics on the basis of the old data 
would have been justified in doing so even if this new theory had occurred to 
them. Just as Newton would have had a right to reject general relativity, on the 
basis of the claim that relative to the data then available, Newtonian theory was 
the simpler, and hence more plausible, explanatory account; in the light of this 
new theory we will still feel that, relative to the old data, quantum theory was 
indeed still the most plausible explanation.
Once again it is possibility (2) which interests us most here. Someone skeptical 
of the current theory on the basis of possibility (1) can be countered as usual 
with the positivist claim of equivalence of the alternatives. Someone skeptical 
on the basis of possibility (3) will be told that, of course, new data can always 
make us reject present theory in terms of a novel alternative, but that is no reason 
to be skeptical of the support present data gives present theory. Possibility (2) 
is the one which simultaneously tells us to be skeptical of even the present 
support quantum mechanics receives from present data, but, at the same time, 
gives us hope that even relative to present experimental results a diligent pursuit 
of imagined alternatives may very well lead us to an account of present exper­
imental facts better than the one we presently, for want of a better alternative, 
accept.
Given the conceptual “nastiness” of quantum theory, one might well wish that 
the hopeful skeptic is right.
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